THE OPERATION AGAINST THE DANISH JEWS IN OCTOBER 1943
Only 481 Danish Jews were arrested and sendt to Terezin - the rest were rescued thanks to a complex, political game behind the scenes. The following is an excert from Bo Lidegaard: Survival - Danish Foreign Policy 1914-45, Copenhagen 2003

Within the first years of the German occupation, the Germans had often raised the question of the status of the Danish Jews. However the Danish government had consistently refused to engage in any debate on the "Jewish question" as they insisted there existed no "Jewish question" in Denmark. It became increasingly clear to Berlin that if they wished to maintain a peaceful occupation and secure the collaboration of the Danish government, it would be opportune not to put pressure on the government. It was abundantly clear that a compromise was out of the question, and as long as the Danish government adhered to collaboration the
"problem" was put aside.

However matters were soon to change. On August 29th 1943, an internal struggle for power between Werner Best and General von Hanneken resulted in the former sending a telegram on September 8th to the German Foreign Office in Berlin on the question of the Danish Jews.

As a result of Best's telegram, Hitler ordered on September 17th that Endlösung was also to encompass Danish Jews. German police forces were ordered to carry out the operations; however, surprisingly the decision
aroused intense criticism within the Nazi machinery. Not of course out of respect for the Jews. The implementation of the operation was seen as putting at risk all future hopes of collaboration and of destroying the frail ties to Danish permanent secretaries and others who were beginning to accept the main precepts of collaboration.
Werner Best's close associate at the Legation in Copenhagen, C.F. Duckwitz, who had established close personal ties with leading Danish Social Democrats travelled to Berlin - in all likelihood with the approval of his boss - ostensibly to intercept Best's telegram but most probably to create the impression that Best was against the imminent operation. On September 23th, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, raised the matter personally with Hitler. He emphasised that any operation against the Danish Jews would be intensely detrimental to the future of Danish collaboration and only create problems for the German occupation. It was all to no avail. Once the Führer had given an order, the order was irreversible.

THE OPERATION
As the date for the operation grew nearer, Duckwitz was, again with the possible approval of his boss, engaged in various attempts to save the situation. On September 22th he travelled secretly to Stockholm where he managed against all odds to meet with the Swedish Prime Minister. Duckwitz informed him of the imminent operation against the Danish Jews. His information sparked a flurry of diplomatic activity. The Swedish Legation in Denmark was ordered to provide travel documents for all Danish Jews. On October 1st, the Swedish Delegation in Berlin offered to intern all Danish Jews in Sweden. They received no answer.

Rumours of the impeding operation began to spread in Denmark by the end of September. On September 28th, Best received the final order to implement the operation and on the same day he informed Berlin that the operation would take place on October 2nd.

On the same day, that is September 28th, Duckwitz met with Hans Hedhoft in Copenhagen and informed him of the impeding operation. He also urged him to pass on the information and spread the warning. Hedtoft immediately contacted the Chairman of The Jewish Community in Denmark, Barrister of the Supreme Court C.B. Henriques, as well as passing on the information through other channels. Next morning, on September 29th, early service was celebrated at the synagogue where the congregation was informed of the imminent operation and by word of mouth the warning was spread to almost all Jews in Copenhagen and the provinces.

Until then, only a few members of the Resistance and a small number of Jews had fled across the Sound. The whole concept of transporting thousands of people to Sweden within a few weeks seemed impossible to the authorities, especially if the transport were to be legal. Finally the authorities decided that an operation against the Danish Jews could result in voluntary internment in a camp at Horserød. It was a difficult and extremely unpleasant decision. By the time this solution reached Best, the German operation was under way.

In the days preceding October 1st, most Danish Jews took refuge with Gentile friends and acquaintances or made their way haphazardly towards various harbours on the coast of the Sound, seeking a passage to Sweden. As a result, the Gestapo who led the German raid on the evening of October 1st, found very few Jews at home. The Nazis had also decreed that the Gestapo might only enter those homes that voluntarily opened their doors. That night, "only" some 200 of the 7,000 Danish Jews were arrested. These were mainly the elderly, sick and lonely, who had neither the initiative nor the will to flee. They were put aboard a waiting ship and deported to the concentration camp Theresienstadt in occupied Czechoslovakia.

Next day, on the October 2nd, Werner Best declared in a telegram to Berlin that the operation had been a success. Denmark was now entjudet, that is - free of Jews. Very few had been captured - but the fact was - they had left Denmark, and that was of the first importance.

RESCUE
On the whole, the refugees met spontaneous help from their fellow citizens who were shocked and appalled by this unexpected attack on their innocent neighbours, acquaintances, colleagues and family members. All sections of society were involved in small or larger rescue operations, and for many this was their first meeting with underground, illegal operation. The well-known escape routes established and used by the Resistance to Sweden could hardly absorb the present demand. Especially members of the Resistance, doctors, priests, hospital workers and students improvised new routes. Societies, companies and private persons raised money in order to finance the transport of Jews to safety. Numerous people lent a helping hand in devising hiding places along the coast for the many refugees awaiting transport.

From a variety of harbours, the Jewish refugees were transported at night in all forms of boats and ships to Sweden or to the Swedish coastguards on open sea. The Swedish authorities, Swedish Jewish organisations and Danish refugees combined to do all that was possible in order to facilitate these transports and to participate in organising the shipment of Danish Jews. On the whole, the operation went well, although certain accidents did happen in the panicked situation in which both the refugees and their helpers were involved.

The story of the Danish people's spontaneous reaction and help at this critical time in history has been told
and retold and still lives in the memory of many who survived or are affected by the Holocaust. However, our understanding of the events will never be complete unless we understand the importance of the Danish, Swedish and - perhaps especially - German authorities' actions and positions. With time, the story has attained mythical proportions. However many factors, amongst these German duplicity, contributed to the high degree of success of the rescue operation.